Abstract This article proposes a new theory of rational decision, distinct from both causal decision theory (CDT) and evidential decision theory (EDT). First, some intuitive counterexamples to CDT and EDT are presented. Then the motivation for the new theory is given: the correct theory of rational decision will resemble CDT in that it will not be sensitive to any comparisons of absolute levels of value across different states of nature, but only to comparisons of the differences in value between the available options within states of nature; however, the correct theory will also resemble EDT in that it will rely on conditional probabilities (not unconditional probabilities). The new theory gives a prominent role to the notion of a "benchmark" for each state of nature, by comparison with which the value of the available options in that state of nature are measured, and so it has been called the Benchmark Theory (BT). It is argued that BT gives the right verdict on the cases that seem to be counterexamples to CDT and EDT. Finally, some objections to BT are considered and answered.
Introduction
theory (CDT) and its main rival, evidential decision theory (EDT). The goal of this paper is to present a new theory of rational decision, distinct from both CDT and EDT, which will be able to accommodate these apparent counterexamples in a principled way. 1 Both CDT and EDT are versions of expected utility theory. 2 So both of these theories define a rational choice as a choice that maximizes expected utility-where the "expected utility" of a choice is the weighted sum of the choice's utilities according to each member of the relevant set of hypotheses about one's situation, when each of these utilities is weighted by the relevant probability of the hypothesis.
CDT and EDT differ from each other in two ways. First, they differ in their view of what I have just called "the relevant set of hypotheses about one's situation." Secondly, they differ in their view of the relevant "probabilities", which are to be used in defining the expected utility of the choice. On the first point, both CDT and EDT agree that the "relevant set of hypotheses about one's situation" must form a partition-that is, a set of propositions about one's situation such that one is rationally certain that exactly one of these propositions is true. However, the two theories differ on which sort of partition is relevant here. According to EDT, the relevant set of hypotheses can be any partition of propositions about one's situation whatsoever. 3 According to CDT, on the other hand, the relevant partition must be a partition of states of nature-that is, one must be rationally certain that it is completely beyond one's control which of the propositions in this partition is true. 4 According to many versions of CDT, these "states of nature"-sometimes called "causal dependency hypotheses"-consist of conjunctions of "non-backtracking" subjunctive conditionals, where each of these conditionals has the form 'If I did act A n , outcome O m would result'. 5 But we need not assume that states of nature must always take this form. The important point for our purposes is just that one is rationally certain that it is utterly beyond one's control which of these states of nature one is actually in.
Secondly, according to CDT, the relevant probabilities are simply the unconditional probabilities of these states of nature-that is, the probabilities that correspond to the credences or degrees of belief that it is rational for one to have in each of these states of nature. According to EDT, on the other hand, the probabilities that are relevant to evaluating a possible course of action A are conditional probabilities, reflecting the conditional credences that it is rational for one to have in the relevant propositions about one's situation, on the assumption that one chooses A-whereas the probabilities relevant to evaluating a different course of action B are conditional probabilities 1 This theory was presented in an earlier version of this paper, which I made available on my web site. So in fact, my theory has already received a penetrating analysis and critique from Rachael Briggs (2010, pp. 10-17) . In this version of the paper, I shall focus on bringing out the underlying motivation behind the theory, and on replying to Briggs's objections. 2 For EDT, see especially Jeffrey (1983) ; for CDT, see especially Joyce (1999). reflecting the conditional credences that it is rational for one to have in each of these propositions on the assumption that one chooses B.
In Sect. 2 of this paper, I shall present some of the cases which have been plausibly claimed, by philosophers such as Egan (2007) , to be counterexamples to EDT and CDT. Then in Sect. 3, I shall briefly discuss the ways in which James Joyce and Frank Arntzenius have responded to these apparent counterexamples, and I shall suggest some reasons for regarding these responses as prima facie problematic.
Then, in the rest of this paper, I shall outline a new theory of rational decision. Although this theory agrees with CDT in focusing on a partition of states of nature, and agrees with EDT in using conditional rather than unconditional probabilities, it disagrees with both theories in that it is not a version of expected utility theory. Instead of using the concept of "utility", it uses a different measure of value instead-specifically, what I shall call the options' "comparative value" in each of the relevant states of nature.
In Sect. 4, I shall present some reasons for thinking that the relevant measure of value is a purely comparative measure of how the available options compare with each other within each state of nature-a measure that completely ignores any comparisons of absolute levels of value that can be made across distinct states of nature. In Sect. 5, I shall briefly present some reasons for thinking that the probabilities that should guide rational choice are conditional probabilities, of the sort that are employed by EDT. Then, in Sect. 6, I shall explain how this approach handles the troublesome cases that were discussed in Sect. 2. All of those cases involve just two options: as we shall see, it is not obvious how best to generalize this approach to the many-option case; I shall canvas a couple of ways of doing this in Sect. 7. Finally, in Sects. 8 and 9, I shall defend this approach against two objections that other decision theorists are likely to raise against it.
Apparent counterexamples to EDT and CDT
This is how Nozick (1969) presents the original Newcomb problem:
Suppose a being [call her 'Alice'] in whose power to predict your choices you have enormous confidence. (One might tell a science-fiction story about a being from another planet, with an advanced technology and science, who you know to be friendly, and so on.) You know that this being has often correctly predicted your choices in the past (and has never, so far as you know, made an incorrect prediction about your choices), and furthermore you know that this being has often correctly predicted the choices of other people, many of whom are similar to you, in the particular situation to be described below. One might tell a longer story, but all this leads you to believe that almost certainly this being's prediction about your choice in the situation to be discussed will be correct. There are two boxes … Suppose that one box is opaque, and the other is transparent. You can see that there is $1,000 in the transparent box, but you do not know what is in the opaque box. You have the choice of either taking both boxes, or taking just the opaque box. You know that Alice has made a prediction about which choice you will make; if she predicted that you would take only the opaque box, she put $1,000,000 in the opaque box-whereas if she predicted that you would take both boxes, she put nothing in the opaque box. Since you are (to all intents and purposes) certain that Alice's prediction was correct, you are (to all intents and purposes) conditionally certain that, given the assumption that you choose both boxes, there is nothing in the opaque box, and also conditionally certain that, given the assumption that you choose only the opaque box, there is $1,000,000 in the opaque box. Let the unconditional probability of there being $1,000,000 in the opaque box be p (so that the unconditional probability of there being nothing in the opaque box is 1 -p). To simplify the case, suppose that your utilities are exactly proportional to the monetary payoffs: Payoffs $1 million in opaque box; $1,000 in transparent box $0 in opaque box; $1,000 in transparent box
You choose opaque box $ 1,000,000 $ 0 You choose both boxes $ 1,001,000 $ 1,000
Conditional probabilities In this case, the evidentially expected utility of "one-boxing" is clearly higher than that of "two-boxing". So, in this case, EDT implies that one-boxing is the unique rational choice to make. On the other hand, whatever the unconditional probabilities of the two relevant states of nature may be, the causally expected utility of two-boxing is bound to be higher than that of one-boxing. So CDT is bound to say that two-boxing is the unique rational choice to make.
Like many (although admittedly not all) philosophers, it seems to me that in this case, CDT is right and EDT is wrong. Two-boxing is rational and one-boxing is irrational. Leaving money on the table is just foolish. As David Lewis (1981, p. 5 ) put it, EDT endorses "an irrational policy of massaging the news". That is, EDT endorses the perverse choice to act in such a way that you give yourself good news about which state of nature you are in, even though there is absolutely nothing that you can do to determine which of these states of nature you are in, and even though the alternative course of action is bound to be preferable whichever state of nature you are in. So it seems that without some further refinement, EDT cannot be the correct theory of rational choice. 6 Unfortunately, there are apparent counterexamples to CDT as well. Here is the Psychopath Button case, which is one of the central examples of Egan (2007) . 7 Suppose that what you want is that-unless it turns out that you are a psychopath yourselfall psychopaths should be exterminated. On the other hand, if it is the case that you are a psychopath yourself, your preference for staying alive strongly outweighs your preference for exterminating psychopaths. As it happens, you can press a button that will kill all psychopaths. You currently give a low probability (let us call it p) to the hypothesis you are a psychopath. But you are 90% convinced that if you press the button, that will show that you are yourself a psychopath; and you are also for some reason convinced that if you don't press the button, that will prove beyond doubt that you are not a psychopath.
Utilities
You are a psychopath You are not a psychopath
You press the button and kill all psychopaths
−90 +10
You do not press the button 0 0
Unconditional probabilities
Conditional probabilities
You press the button and kill all psychopaths 0.9 0.1 You do not press the button 0 1
Causally expected utilities
Total
CDT seems to imply that if p is smaller than 0.1, the only rational choice that you can make in this case is to press the button.
However, this is not obviously the right thing to say about this case. Even if it could conceivably be rational for you to choose to press the button, it could surely also be rational for you to choose not to press the button. After all, on the assumption that you will press the button, you should be 90% convinced that you are a psychopath, and that by pressing the button you will kill yourself. It seems perfectly rational for an agent-even an agent who starts out attaching a probability of less than 0.1 to the proposition that he is a psychopath-to choose not to press the button for this reason. But CDT seems to imply that choosing not to press the button in this case would be irrational. CDT seems to give the wrong verdict here.
Not all philosophers accept the claim that CDT implies that the unique rational choice in this case is to press the button. In particular, as we shall see in the next section, this claim has been disputed by James Joyce. Before discussing this point, however, I shall note that we cannot deal with this case by insisting that a rational choice must be "ratifiable", in the sense that was defined by Richard Jeffrey (1983, pp. 15-20) . In general, the choice of a course of action A i is "ratifiable" if and only if there is no other course of action A j such that the conditionally expected utility of A j , on the assumption that one chooses A i , is greater than the conditionally expected utility of A i on the assumption that one chooses A i .
In the Psychopath Button case, neither course of action is ratifiable:
Conditionally expected utilities (on the assumption that you choose to press) You are a psychopath You are not a psychopath Total
You do not press the button 0 × 0.9 0 × 0.1 0
Conditionally expected utilities (on the assumption that you choose not to press)
You are a psychopath You are not a psychopath Total
You do not press the button
In this case, given the assumption that you choose to press, not pressing has a higher expected utility; and given the assumption that you choose not to press the button, pressing has a higher expected utility. So neither option is ratifiable. So, if only ratifiable options can be rationally chosen, neither the choice to press nor the choice not to press would be rational: at best, the only options that could rationally be chosen would be so-called "mixed strategies", such as the strategy of pressing the button with a probability of 0.1 and not pressing with a probability of 0.9. We shall discuss such "mixed strategies" in the next section, but it is far from clear that this approach is correct. Intuitively, it seems perfectly rational to make an outright choice not to press the button; it seems dubious to claim that every choice in this case except for the choice of a "mixed strategy" is irrational. 8 In this way, then, none of the best-known approaches gives an obviously correct verdict on these cases.
Joyce and Arntzenius
In this section, I shall discuss the responses to Egan's argument that have been given by Joyce (forthcoming) and Arntzenius (2008) . As I shall argue, both Joyce and Arntzenius are committed to some very strange and controversial claims within the philosophy of action. 9
As we have seen, Egan (2007) claims that if the unconditional probability that you initially assign to your being a psychopath is lower than 0.1, then CDT implies that the only rational choice in this case is to press the button. Joyce (forthcoming) disputes this claim. According to Joyce (forthcoming, 4) , CDT does indeed imply that you should evaluate each act using your current unconditional probabilities; but it does not imply that you should always act on this evaluation. Instead, Joyce's version of CDT requires that you should act on the evaluation of these acts that you make at a time t only if this evaluation is based on probabilities "that incorporate all the evidence that is both freely available to you at t and relevant to the question of what your acts are likely to cause." Suppose that your initial probability for the hypothesis that you are a psychopath is 0.05. Then-Joyce claims-the fact that given this initial probability assignment, pressing the button has a higher causally expected utility than not pressing should lead you to raise the probability that you assign to the proposition that you will press the button. But if you raise the probability that you assign to your pressing the button, you must also raise the probability that you assign to your being a psychopath. So, Joyce claims, if you acted on an evaluation that was based on your initial assignment of a probability of 0.05 to your being a psychopath, you would be failing to take account of freely available relevant information.
Of course, if you raised the probability of your being a psychopath above 0.1-say, to 0.2-then according to these new probabilities, not pressing the button would have a higher causally expected utility than pressing; and this should lead you to regard it as fairly probable that you will not press the button, which would in turn require that you lower the probability of your being a psychopath again. Rather than endlessly oscillating between probability assignments in this way, a rational agent-according to Joyce-will always adopt a probability assignment that is in equilibrium. That is, if you are rational, you will assign a set of probabilities that is stable in the light of the utilities of all the available acts according to those probabilities.
In this case, the only probability assignments that are in equilibrium in this way involve assigning a probability of 0.1 to your pressing the button, and 0.09 to your being a psychopath. Given these probabilities, both options have equal causally expected utility. So Joyce concludes that CDT implies that both options are equally rational in this case. As Joyce (forthcoming, note 23) puts it, if you are rational, you will simply arbitrarily "pick" one of these options (just as Buridan's ass has to "pick" one of the two "equally attractive haystacks" that the ass is confronted with).
However, Joyce's solution has some implications that would strike anyone who is familiar with contemporary philosophy of action as decidedly strange, to say the least. Suppose that you "pick" the option of pressing the button. According to Joyce, even though you have "picked" pressing the button, you must not raise the probability that you assign to your pressing the button above 0.1-since if you did, it would then no longer be rational for you to choose to press the button. But every choice-even if the choice is a case of arbitrary "picking"-involves forming an intention; and it seems that rationally executing an intention to press the button must involve acting in a reasonably confident belief that one is pressing the button. 10 It is hard to see how you can have a "reasonably confident belief" that you are pressing the button while assigning a probability of only 0.1 to the proposition that you are pressing the button! In this way, Joyce's solution is hard to reconcile with the intimate connection that seems to exist between the rational execution of an intention and belief.
There may perhaps be one way in which Joyce's solution could be reconciled with this connection between the execution of intention and belief: Joyce could claim that if you rationally press the button, then you must assign a probability of 0.1 to your pressing the button right up to a moment when you irrevocably commit yourself to pressing the button. After that moment, the option of not pressing the button is simply no longer available, and so the fact that from that moment onwards, you assign a higher probability to your pressing the button, which will make pressing the button appear inferior to not pressing (a course of action that is no longer available), does not cast doubt on the rationality of pressing the button.
However, it is doubtful whether we have the power to make such irrevocable commitments. Even if you commit yourself at time t to pressing the button as soon as possible after t, you do not have the power to prevent a time lag from occurring, between your making this commitment and your act of pressing the button, which will give you an opportunity to change your mind. So it remains doubtful whether Joyce's solution can be reconciled with the connection between the execution of intention and belief.
Moreover, Joyce's solution also seems intuitively wrong. If you choose not to press the button, you are surely not rationally required to continue assigning a probability of just 0.9 to the proposition that you will not press the button. You might quite rationally become virtually certain that you will not press the button, and so assign a probability that is considerably greater than 0.9 to the proposition that you will not press the button. Even if you assign such a high probability to your not pressing the button (and so also to your not being a psychopath), it still seems that it would intuitively be quite rational for you persist with your intention not to press the button. Joyce's claim that you must continue to assign these "equilibrium" probabilities to your own future actions seems intuitively wrong. Arntzenius (2008) has independently developed a solution that is in many ways similar to Joyce's. However, there are two main differences. First, Arntzenius (2008, p. 291) agrees with Egan that CDT implies that pressing the button is the unique rational choice in this case, and that this case "elicits" an objection that shows CDT to be "unsatisfactory" (p. 277). So, in his view, CDT must be amended by the addition of a principle that requires rational agents to assign these "equilibrium" probabilities to their future actions and to the relevant states of nature (p. 293). Secondly, Arntzenius holds that because both the choice to press the button and the choice not to press the button have the feature that as soon as you make the choice, you will wish that you had made the other choice, neither choice is rational (p. 291). Instead, he argues that the only rational choice in this case is what he calls a "mixed decision".
In fact, however, Arntzenius interprets such a "mixed decision" as consisting simply in an epistemic state-the state of assigning various probabilities to various hypotheses about one's own future actions (p. 292). He seems to think that this epistemic state can lead one directly to action, without having to be mediated by any other mental state-such as a choice or the formation of intention-whose status as rational or irrational would have to be explained by some theory of rational choice or rational intention.
In this way, Arntzenius' solution involves a conception of intentional action that is just as strange as Joyce's. Even if your assignment of a probability of 0.1 to the proposition that you will press the button somehow causes you to press the button, it is hard to see how this can count as your intentionally pressing the button, unless this causal chain is mediated by other mental states-like your having an intention to press the button, or your willing a bodily movement that you confidently believe to be a pressing of the button. Moreover, since Arntzenius like Joyce must insist that even when you rationally press the button, you cannot assign a probability of more than 0.1 to the proposition that you are pressing the button, his solution also seems hard to reconcile to the intimate connection that seems to exist between intentional action and belief. So it also seems doubtful whether Arntzenius has provided a successful solution to the problem.
Finally, we should note that this problem also cannot be solved by appealing to a more orthodox conception of "mixed strategies", according to which a mixed strategy would involve something like: tossing a biased coin that has a 0.1 chance of landing heads and a 0.9 chance of landing tails, and pressing the button if it lands heads and not pressing the button if it lands tails. Arntzenius (2008, p. 292) has emphasized some of the problems with this orthodox conception of mixed strategies. First, these mixed strategies are not always, or even usually, available to us: it is not as if one has a "chance device" that can play the role of a suitably biased coin "stored away in some convenient part of one's brain". Secondly, even if such mixed strategies were always available, they "would amount to a different decision situation, namely one in which we have an uncountable infinity of pure acts that we can perform, the acts being the possible ways we have of setting the chance 'dials' of the chance device." Anyway, it seems legitimate for us simply to stipulate that the Psychopath Button case is a case in which only two options are available to you-pressing the button, and not pressing the button. (Perhaps a demon will immediately strike you dead if you attempt to implement a mixed strategy.) So, the orthodox conception of mixed strategies also seems unlikely to help to solve the problem.
Frodo and Gandalf
Consider the dialogue that I have chosen as the epigraph to this paper, from J. R. R. Tolkien's Lord of the Rings. In this dialogue, Frodo expresses the wish that his "time" had been different from what it actually is. It is clear from the context that the facts about his "time" that he wishes had been different are facts that are utterly beyond his power to change in any way. They are facts that are, as Gandalf puts it, are simply "given to us": there is nothing that we can do to change these facts. So Frodo's wish focuses on a comparison between certain facts about the actual world, facts that he cannot change in any way, and certain other, more desirable possibilities that might have obtained instead.
Gandalf acknowledges that such wishes are universal (and so presumably reasonable). But he goes on to draw a sharp distinction between wishes and decisions: the "time" that agents have to confront "is not for them to decide." As he says, "All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given us." Our wishes may quite reasonably focus on facts about the actual world that are beyond our power to change, and compare these facts with other more desirable possibilities. But although such comparisons are relevant to what it is appropriate to wish for, Gandalf seems to be implying that such comparisons are irrelevant to what it is appropriate to decide. Decisions have to focus instead on "what to do". While the "time that is given us" is beyond our control, what we "do with" that time is within our control. Presumably, our decisions must be based on comparisons between different things that we might do, but-unlike our wishes-they must ignore all comparisons between different possible "times" that we might be confronted with.
What Gandalf calls the "time" that is "given" to us seems to be precisely what CDT calls a "state of nature". Specifically, it is not merely a possible state of nature; it is the state of nature that actually obtains. So Gandalf's point is that comparisons between the actual state of nature and other merely possible states of nature are irrelevant to decision making. Instead, our decisions should be based purely on comparisons between the available acts, not between different possible states of nature.
Someone might object, in the following way. "Surely, Gandalf is just saying that decision makers need to attend to the actual situation. But this is a perfectly obvious point, which cannot help us to devise a new form of decision theory." But this objection fails to grasp the point that Gandalf seems to be implying. The point is not just that decision makers must attend to the actual state of nature. It is a stronger and more striking point-that decision makers should ignore, and pay no attention to, any comparisons between the actual state of nature and any other merely possible states of nature.
Why does Gandalf insist that such comparisons between different possible states of nature are irrelevant for the purposes of decision making? I suggest that Gandalf is not focusing here on cases where the decision makers are uncertain about which state of nature is the actual one. He is focusing on cases in which decision makers are, at least for all practical purposes, certain about what the actual state of nature is. If you are rationally certain about which state of nature is actual, then the way in which you should make your decisions or choices is simply to choose an option that is at least as good, in the actual state of nature, as any other option that you could have chosen. If you choose an option of this kind, you will certainly have done the best that you can. You might be in a really nasty state of nature, in which the future is bound to be nastier than the past, irrespective of what you do-so that the very best that you can do is to minimize the horrors that the future will contain. But if your chosen option is no worse than any available alternative, then although you may reasonably wish that the state of nature had been otherwise, the way in which you will have made your choice or decision is exactly as it should be.
In general, if one is certain about what the actual state of nature is, then one should choose an option that is optimal in the actual state of nature. This is determined purely by the way in which one's chosen option compares with the available alternatives within the actual state of nature. It is quite irrelevant how one's chosen option compares with the alternatives in other states of nature. To determine what one should choose, one does not even need to know how the actual state of nature compares with other states of nature. All that one needs to know is which of the available acts are better, and which are worse, than the alternatives in the actual state of nature.
Different theories disagree profoundly about what it is for one act to be "better" than (or "at least as good" as) another in the relevant sense. Many theories of rational choice assume that the relevant sort of "goodness" is "utility", interpreting "utility" as a measure of how strongly one prefers various outcomes. I shall not rely on this assumption here. I shall not assume that it is possible, even in principle, to measure preferences by means of such utility functions. Moreover, even if preferences can be measured by such utility functions, I shall not assume that it is always rational to maximize preference-satisfaction. (Perhaps it is sometimes rational to overrule one's preferences rather than to gratify them?) The only assumption that I shall rely on here is that there is some notion of what it is for one option to be "better than" (or "at least as good as") another, which plays this role in determining what you should choose.
Indeed, Gandalf's point that wishes and decisions are subject to fundamentally different norms might be taken to suggest that the kind of goodness or value that makes a state of affairs appropriate to wish for is fundamentally different from the kind of goodness or value that makes an option appropriate to choose: the former kind of goodness measures the desirability of states of affairs, while the latter kind of goodness in effect measures the rightness or choiceworthiness of available courses of action. If this suggestion is correct, then there is no need for the latter kind of "goodness" to attach any meaning at all to comparisons between the degree of goodness that an act has in one state of nature and the degree of goodness that an act has in any other state of nature. In order to determine how you should choose in such cases, it would not matter if such comparisons were in fact completely meaningless. All that would be necessary is that we can compare the available acts within the relevant state of nature.
If Gandalf is focusing on cases where one is certain about what the actual state of nature is, what can his point tell us about cases where one is not certain? As we have seen, to determine how one should choose when one is certain about what the actual state of nature is, one simply does not need to know whether one is in a nice state of nature or a nasty state of nature. Indeed, it would not even matter if it were completely meaningless to compare the degree of goodness that an option has in one state of nature with the degree of goodness that an option has in another state of nature.
I suggest the following way of generalizing Gandalf's point to cases involving uncertainty: to make a rational choice in such cases, one does not need to consider whether one is in is a nice state of nature or a nasty one. All that one needs to consider are the degrees to which each of the available options is better (or worse) than the available alternatives within each of the relevant states of nature. Admittedly, when one is uncertain which state of nature one is in, one must make some comparisons across the states of nature. But since one does not even need to know whether one is in a nice state of nature or a nasty one, it seems that the only relevant comparisons are comparisons of the differences in levels of goodness between the various options within each state of nature with the differences between those options within each of the other states of nature-not any comparisons of absolute levels of goodness across different states of nature. It may even be that there is really no meaning at all to any comparisons of absolute levels of goodness across states of nature. All that is required is that one can compare the differences in levels of goodness between the available options in one state of nature with the differences between the options in other states of nature.
This suggestion would support the following diagnosis of what exactly is irrational about one-boxing in the original Newcomb problem. The only arguments that could possibly be given in favour of one-boxing would have to rely on the comparison between the outcome of getting $1,000,000 (if you take just the one box) and the outcome of getting $1,000 (if you instead take both boxes). But according to this diagnosis, this is an essentially irrelevant comparison between the absolute payoff of one-boxing in one state of nature and the absolute payoff of two-boxing in another state of nature. In fact, the only relevant comparison across these two states of nature is the comparison of the differences between the two options within each state of nature-that is, the comparison of the difference between $1,000,000 and $1,001,000 in the first state of nature with the difference between $0 and $1,000 in the second state of nature. In this case, the result of this comparison is that in both states of nature, the payoff of two-boxing is $1,000 more than that of one-boxing. According to this Gandalf-inspired diagnosis, this is the only relevant comparison across these states of nature.
If the agent is swayed by the essentially irrelevant comparison between the absolute payoff of one option in one state of nature with the absolute payoff of an alternative option in another state of nature, then she will be acting in a way that indicates that she is in a nice state of nature (a state of nature where there is $1,000,000 in front of her that is hers for the taking) rather than a nasty one (a state of nature where there is no $1,000,000 that is hers for the taking). But by the very definition of states of nature, she is rationally certain that there is nothing that she can do to affect which state of nature she is actually in. So being swayed by this irrelevant comparison is indeed, as Lewis (1981, p. 5) complained, "an irrational policy of massaging the news".
In fact, CDT already implicitly respects this point. Comparisons of absolute levels of utility across different states of nature in fact have no effect within CDT on which options it is rational to choose. In CDT, the expected utility of an act A j is:
where P is the relevant probability function, U is the relevant utility function, and S 1 , S 2 , . . . are the relevant states of nature. If we arbitrarily change the absolute levels of utility in S 1 by adding a constant c (which may be any real number, either positive or negative) to the utility of every option in S 1 , then the expected utility of A j will be:
But this is just the sum of the old expected utility of A j and P(S 1 )c, which is itself a constant. So the change merely adds a constant to the expected utility of every option. Consequently, the new expected utility function ranks the options in exactly the same order as the original one did, making no difference to which options it is rational to choose.
In short, comparisons of absolute levels of utility across states of nature are irrelevant to what it is rational to choose according to CDT. 11 It would not even matter to CDT if comparisons of absolute levels of utility across states of nature were meaningless. The only comparisons across states of nature that matter according to CDT are comparisons of the differences between the options within each state of nature.
As I explained in Sect. 2, I am assuming here that EDT must be rejected, and that the correct theory of rational decision will agree with CDT in rejecting the choice of one-boxing in the Newcomb problem. A decision theory could do this is by agreeing with CDT in insisting that the only relevant probabilities are unconditional probabilities, rather than conditional probabilities of the sort that are invoked by EDT. But in the next section, I shall argue that decision theory must in fact appeal to such conditional probabilities. So it seems that the only way for our decision theory to rule out one-boxing is by agreeing with CDT on a different point: namely, on the point that comparisons of absolute levels of goodness across states of nature are irrelevant, and that the only relevant comparisons across states of nature are comparisons of the differences in goodness between the available options within each of these states of nature.
Why conditional probabilities?
According to the suggestions that I made in the previous section, to determine how you should choose, even in cases where you are certain what the actual state of nature is, you have to compare different possible acts. In effect, you have to compare what you will actually do with what you would have done in the non-actual possible worlds in which you decided otherwise. In this sense, practical deliberation certainly involves considering non-actual possible worlds. Judgments about non-actual possible worlds are most commonly expressed (at least in languages like English) by "subjunctive" or "counterfactual" conditionals. This may seem to support CDT, because CDT insists that rational choice must be defined in terms of a partition of states of nature, and it is widely assumed that these states of nature can be expressed by conjunctions of ("non-backtracking") subjunctive conditionals.
However, this point only shows that it is natural to formulate these states of nature by means of counterfactual conditionals. It does not show that CDT is right about the kind of probabilities that we need to rely on when we are not certain what the actual state of nature is. So, are the relevant probabilities the unconditional probabilities of the relevant states of nature, as CDT claims? Or are they, as EDT claims, conditional 11 Enthusiasts for ethical theory may be interested to note that this feature of CDT is precisely analogous to a fact about utilitarianism that was pointed out by Amartya Sen (1973) -namely, the fact that in cases where population is fixed, utilitarianism does not need to make any interpersonal comparisons of absolute levels of welfare, but only interpersonal comparisons of welfare differences for individuals between the different outcomes. Indeed, it would not even matter for utilitarianism, at least as applied to fixed-population cases, if interpersonal comparisons of absolute levels of welfare were completely meaningless: it is only interpersonal comparisons of welfare differences that must be meaningful if utilitarianism is to be applicable to these cases. probabilities-that is, probabilities that are conditional on the assumption of one's making the choice in question?
Rational decision-making consists of exploring and comparing possible plans of action. Exploring such a plan of action consists in considering the hypothesis or supposition that one has that plan. In effect, one asks oneself, "Suppose that I choose to do A-then what?" Now, the crucial point is that one is considering the supposition that one chooses to do A as a hypothesis about the actual world. After all, one is really only in the business of making a decision for the actual world; one is not in the business of making decisions for non-actual possible worlds. So rational decision-making involves evaluating available plans of action as hypotheses about what one will actually do (not as hypotheses about how things are in non-actual possible worlds).
The mental activity of considering suppositions or hypotheses is typically expressed linguistically by the use of conditionals; as many philosophers since Hobbes have emphasized, the language of deliberation is packed full of conditionals. 12 For our purposes, however, we do not need to wade into all the disputed issues in the philosophy of language, about how to explain the distinctive meaning of conditional statements. Instead, we need to understand the mental activity of considering suppositions and their consequences, which is expressed by such conditionals. It has often been suggested that there are two ways of considering suppositions-one way that is expressed by "subjunctive" conditionals, and another way that is expressed by "indicative" or "matter-of-fact" conditionals. 13 According to this suggestion, the first, "subjunctive" way of considering a supposition involves considering the proposition as true in a class of possible worlds that includes non-actual worlds, while the second "indicative" way of considering a supposition involves considering the proposition as a hypothesis about the actual world. This makes it plausible that both ways of considering suppositions are crucial for rational decision making. As we have seen, it seems that decision theory must make a distinction between the acts that are within one's control, and the states of nature are out of one's control; and it seems plausible that these states of nature can be expressed as conjunctions of ("non-backtracking") subjunctive conditionals. But it also seems plausible that rational deliberation involves the "indicative" way of considering suppositions as well, since for each of the relevant courses of action, deliberation involves considering the supposition that one chooses that course of action, as a hypothesis about what one will choose in the actual world. 14 What is involved in considering a supposition as a hypothesis about the actual world? It seems to involve the following process. When one considers a supposition in this way, one is, in effect, adding the supposition to the propositions that-as one believes-represent the actual world, and then considering what the world looks like 12 As Hobbes (1651, Chap. 6, para. 55) put it, "Deliberation is expressed" by means of "a speech proper to signify suppositions, with their consequences; as, if this be done, then this will follow". 13 See especially Joyce (1999, pp. 182-183) and Weatherson (2001) .
14 Andy Egan (personal communication) tells me that he currently working on a new objection to CDTthe objection that by focusing on subjunctive conditionals rather than indicative conditionals, CDT neglects relevant information about the actual world (Egan plans to illustrate this point with examples involving time travel or oracles or the like). This point is entirely in harmony with the point that I am making here.
when it has that supposition added to it. Presumably, in considering what the world looks like when it has this supposition added to it, this supposition itself is treated as if were effectively certain: on the supposition that one has the plan of doing A, it is treated as certain that one has the plan of doing A.
More specifically, this metaphor of "adding" seems to be most naturally understood as simply conjoining the hypothesis in question with each of the propositions that (as one believes) represent the actual world, and conditionally accepting the adjusted view of the world that results from all those conjunctions. In effect, this would involve forming a set of conditional beliefs in these propositions that optimally reflects one's prior degrees of belief in the conjunctions of each of these propositions with the hypothesis in question. Let us assume that a rational person's degrees of belief can be modelled by means of a probability function P, and that their conditional beliefs on the supposition of a hypothesis C can be modelled by means of another probability function P(• C). Then P(• C) should obey the constraint that so long as P(C) > 0, then for all propositions X and Y, P(X C) ≥ P(Y C) if and only if P(X &C) ≥ P(Y &C). As Joyce (1999, pp. 195-196) has shown, this constraint is enough to guarantee that P(• C) is the familiar conditional probability function, which results from P by conditionalization on C. 15 So, if I am right that rational decision making involves exploring possible plans, and exploring such a possible plan involves considering the supposition that one has that plan, then it seems that the probabilities that should guide one's evaluation of a given act A are probabilities in which the proposition that one has the plan of doing A is treated as certain, while the probabilities that should guide one's evaluation of a different act B are probabilities in which the proposition that one has the plan of doing B is treated as certain. 16 Moreover, given that one is choosing a course of action for the actual world, and not for other merely possible worlds, it seems to follow that these probabilities are the familiar conditional probabilities, of precisely the sort that are appealed to by EDT. 17 15 Strictly speaking, as Joyce (1999, p. 196) explains, while there are several "supposition functions" that can satisfy this constraint if P is defined on a small algebra of propositions, "The only supposition functions generally capable of satisfying [this constraint] must be ones that coincide with the ordinary conditional probability when the proposition being supposed has positive probability." The proof of this relies on some basic axioms about such "supposition functions": specifically, P(C||C) = 1; if P(C) = 1, P(•||C) = P(•); and if P(C||C * ) = 1 and P(C * ||C) = 1 (i.e. if C and C * can be inferred with certainty from each other), then P(•||C) = P(•||C * ). 16 In effect, Joyce (1999, p. 178) agrees with this point, since he holds that the probabilities that one should use to evaluate an act A are probabilities that are "imaged" on A-which, as he explains, must be probabilities in which A has probability 1. 17 An anonymous referee for this journal suggested that this point-that rational decision makers must consider each relevant plan of action as a hypothesis about what one will choose to do in the actual world-can be captured by the idea that the way to evaluate an act A is by means of the following formula:
-where O i ranges over possible outcomes, S j over possible states of nature and V(O i ) is the appropriate sort of "value" of the outcome O i . But as the referee points out, this just is Causal Decision Theory! One possible problem with this suggestion is that it postulates "outcomes" as something additional to acts, states of nature, and the degrees of goodness that acts have in each state of nature; and I see no need to introduce any such "outcomes" here. But a more serious problem with this suggestion is that by giving a fundamental role to the unconditional probability of states of nature P(S j ), it does not really respect the point (which as I explained in the previous footnote, even advocates of CDT
Evidentially expected comparative value
If the foregoing suggestions are along the right lines, then we need a theory of rational choice according to which a rational choice is one that maximizes the evidential expectation of some purely comparative measure of how the chosen option compares with other options within each state of nature. This purely comparative measure must be insensitive to any comparisons of the absolute values of options across different states of nature: it must reflect nothing but the differences in value between these options within each of the relevant states of nature. An appropriate measure of this kind, if it can be found, can be called a measure of the options' "comparative value". We could then say that a rational choice is one that maximizes evidentially expected comparative value.
There is a fairly natural measure of "comparative value" to use in the case where there are just two options that one is choosing between. In this section, I shall first articulate a way of dealing with the two-option case. Then I shall explain why there is a problem with generalizing this approach so that it can deal with the many-option case. In Sect. 7, I shall make a tentative suggestion about how to solve this problem.
Let A 1 , A 2 be a pair of acts each of which the agent rationally believes to be available. Let S 1 , . . . S n be an (exhaustive and exclusive) partition of "states of nature". As I explained above, "states of nature" are facts about the agent's situation that the agent rationally believes to be entirely beyond her control.
Let us assume that for each of these acts A i , and each of these states of nature S j , S j has a certain "probability" conditional on the agent's choosing A i ; let us abbreviate this conditional probability as 'P(S j |A i )'. To fix ideas, let us assume that the "probability" of S j conditional on the agent's choosing A i is just the conditional credence that it is rational for the agent to place in S j on the assumption that she will choose A i .
The agent may not be certain which of these states of nature she is actually in, but for every act A i and every state of nature S j , the agent is certain what "degree of goodness" A i has in S j . In effect, S j must somehow entail a conjunctive proposition of the form ' A 1 would be good to degree d 1 & A 2 would be good to degree d 2 ', for real numbers d 1 , d 2 . Now suppose that there is some function that for every state of nature S j , selects a certain value or degree of goodness as the "benchmark" value for S j . To fix ideas, suppose that if the value of A 1 in S j is d 1 , and the value of A 2 in S j is d 2 , then the benchmark for S j is simply the average of d 1 and d 2 , b j . 18 Then we can say that the Footnote 17 continued like Joyce accept) that the only relevant probabilities for evaluating an act A are probabilities in which it is certain that one will choose A. To evaluate an act A seriously, as a possible object of choice, one must explore the supposition that A is what one will choose-i.e., one must evaluate A from a perspective in which it is suppositionally taken for granted that one will indeed choose A. Otherwise, it seems, one is not seriously evaluating A as a possible object of choice at all. 18 As we shall see in the Sect. 7, it may sometimes be rational to use a different "benchmark" from this. But it seems natural to start with the "neutral" setting-exactly at the midpoint between the two acts A 1 and A 2 .
comparative value of A 1 in S j is d 1 − b j , and the comparative value of A 2 in S j is d 2 − b j . We may abbreviate the comparative value of A i in S j as 'CV(A i , S j )'.
For our purposes, the important point about this conception of comparative value is that it does not require the assumption that there is even any meaning to comparisons of absolute levels of goodness across different states of nature; it relies only on the point that we can compare the differences between levels of goodness in one state of nature with differences in levels of goodness in other states of nature.
For any act A i that belongs to this pair of acts A 1 , A 2 , the "evidentially expected comparative value" of act A i is the sum of A i 's "comparative value" in each of these states of nature S j , weighted by the probability of S j conditional on the agent's choosing A i . That is, the evidentially expected comparative value of A i is:
Then we can say that it is rational to choose an act A i just in case the evidentially expected comparative value of A i is no less than that of any alternative. Because of the role of the "benchmark" in defining acts' comparative value in each state of nature, Rachael Briggs (2010) So, according to this theory BT, you should choose both boxes in the original Newcomb problem. In this respect, BT agrees with CDT. In general, it is easy to see that in any two-option case in which there is a dominant option-in the sense that this option is optimal in every state of nature-then BT implies that such dominant options will be the only options that it is rational to choose. Moreover, it is also easy to see that BT will also agree with CDT in all the "normal" cases, where all the various relevant states of nature are probabilistically independent of one's choice. 19 BT will only differ from CDT in cases where there is no dominant option, and the relevant states of nature are not probabilistically independent of one's choice. One such case is Egan's Psychopath Button case, which we discussed in Sect. 2. The way in which BT deals with this case can be illustrated by means of the following tables.
Payoffs

You are a psychopath You are not a psychopath
You press the button and kill all psychopaths 
Evidentially expected comparative values
Total
You do not kill all psychopaths
So, in this case (at least when the "benchmark" in each state of nature is set in this way), BT implies that the rational choice is to choose not to press the button-which again seems an intuitively plausible result. 20 Unfortunately, it is not straightforward to generalize BT to the many-option case. The natural way to extend BT to the many-option case would be by taking the "benchmark" b j in each state of nature S j as the average degree of goodness in S j of all the available options. Then we could use this benchmark b j to define the "overall comparative value" of all the available options in S j , by simply identifying the "overall comparative value" of any option A i in S j with d i − b j ; and we could say that it is rational to choose an option if and only if the option has maximal evidentially expected "overall comparative value" of this kind. But if we extend BT to the many-option case in this way, then the resulting theory of rational choice turns out to have a troubling defect.
The problem is that, in fact, in every situation in which we have to make a choice, there is an enormous number of perfectly dreadful courses of action that are at least physically (if not psychologically) "available". For example, you could commit a serious crime in a way that is certain to result in your being arrested; you could give every penny that you have to the politician whom you most despise; you could commit suicide in various agonizing ways, using various items that you keep in the cupboards and drawers of your kitchen; and so on. Of course, we hardly ever even think of doing such insane things, but in principle they are available. It does not seem that the bare fact that these courses of action are available should make a difference to what it is rational to choose.
If the available courses of action include all these insane options, and the benchmark for each state of nature is the average value of all these available options, then this "benchmark" will be a lot lower than it would otherwise be. It is easy to show that these lower benchmarks would often have the effect of leading to the opposite decision between a pair of options A and B from the decision that one would make if the benchmark in each of the relevant states of nature were the average degree of goodness of A and B. (Suppose that on the assumption that you choose A, B looks slightly better than A; while on the assumption that you choose B, A looks vastly better than B. Then, if the benchmark in each state of nature is the average value of A and B, BT would require choosing A. But if in both states of nature the benchmark is much lower than the values of both A and B, then it could turn out that on the assumption that you choose A, A appears to be better than the relevant benchmark to a certain degree n, while on the assumption that you choose B, B appears to be better than the relevant benchmark to a certain greater degree m. Then a version of BT that made use of these benchmarks would require choosing B.)
As I have suggested here, however, the bare fact that these utterly insane courses of action are available should not make a difference to what it is rational to choose. Any theory according to which it does make a difference suffers from a grave defect. But it is clear that the natural way of extending BT to the many-option case would suffer from precisely this defect. So we need to find a different way of extending BT so that it can handle the many-option case in a satisfactory way. I shall tentatively propose an alternative way of extending BT in the next section.
"Reasonable" ways of setting the benchmarks
As we have seen, BT needs to identify a "benchmark" for each state of nature, in order to measure the comparative values of the available options within that state of nature. There are admittedly some situations where it will not matter exactly where these "benchmarks" lie. As we have seen, in all the "normal" situations, where the states of nature are probabilistically quite independent of one's choice, BT will simply coincide with CDT irrespective of where the benchmarks lie. Moreover, in any two-option case in which there is a "dominant" option (as in the original Newcomb problem), it will also make no difference where the benchmarks lie: wherever these benchmarks may be, in such situations, all and only the dominant options will be rational. However, there will also be other situations-such as Egan (2007) Psychopath Button case-where it does make a difference where these benchmarks lie.
One fairly extreme method would be to identify the benchmark in each state of nature with the optimal value in that state of nature. Measuring the comparative value of the options in this state of nature in terms of how far they fall short from this optimal value gives us the measure that has become known as "regret". If the benchmarks were set in this way, a rational choice would be one that minimizes evidentially expected regret. Another extreme method would be to identify the benchmarks with the lowest or pessimal value in each state of nature. Measuring the comparative value of the options in terms of how far they exceed this lowest value would give us a measure that we could call "relief". 21 If the benchmarks were set in this way, a rational choice would be one that maximizes evidentially expected relief.
Both of these two views of rational choice would be rather extreme. According to the rule of maximizing evidentially expected relief, in every state of nature, the options that are better than the lowest-ranked options are "marked up" for the extent to which they are better than the lowest-ranked options, but the lowest-ranked options are not in any way "marked down" for the extent to which they are worse than the other options. So consider any case that-like Egan's Psychopath Button case-has the following features. First, there are only two options, A and B (for example, suppose that A is not pressing the button and B is pressing the button). Second, on the assumption that you choose A, it is virtually certain that A is the lowest-ranked option and that option B is slightly better than A-whereas, on the assumption that you choose B, it is virtually certain that B is the lowest-ranked option but that option A is dramatically better than B. Then the rule of maximizing evidentially expected relief would rate these two choices as equally rational-thereby overlooking an intuitively obvious reason for favouring option A over B.
On the other hand, according to the rule of minimizing evidentially expected regret, the suboptimal options in every state of nature are "marked down" for the extent to which they are inferior to the optimal options, but the optimal options are in any way not "marked up" for the extent to which they are better than those suboptimal alternatives. For example, consider the following case: on the assumption that one chooses A, it is to all intents and purposes conditionally certain that A will be optimal, and that B will be very slightly less good than A-whereas on the assumption that one chooses B, it is conditionally certain that B will be optimal, and that A will be dramatically less good than B. The rule of minimizing evidentially expected regret would treat these two choices as equally rational; but this seems to overlook an intuitively obvious reason for favouring B over A.
This was why in introducing the idea of "comparative value" in the previous section, I avoided both of these two extreme ways of setting the benchmarks, and suggested setting the benchmarks exactly half-way between the values that the two options in question have in each state of nature. This suggests that the best way to extend BT to the many-option case is to try to find what we could call the "reasonable" ways of setting the benchmarks.
The problem that we saw for the simplest way of extending this approach to the many-option case involved all of the perfectly insane and terrible options that are in fact available at all times, but which we usually never even consider. One straightforward way to avoid this problem is to insist on excluding from consideration all the options that do not deserve to be taken seriously. We could then say that every "reasonable" way of setting these benchmarks would identify the benchmark for each state of nature with some kind of weighted average of the degrees of goodness within the state of nature of all the options that deserve to be taken seriously.
I propose that there are three main ways in which an option can count as one that does not deserve to be taken seriously. First, it might be that one already knows perfectly well that there is no chance that one will ever choose that option. Then it seems clear that there is no point in considering the option. Secondly, one might strongly suspect that even if one does choose the option, one will change one's mind and abandon one's choice before the time comes to execute the choice. Then again it seems that the option should not be seriously considered. Finally, we should also insist on excluding from consideration all those options that are dominated by some other option. If one option A is dominated by another option B-in the sense that B is better than A in some state of nature and at least as good as A in every state of nature-then the dominated option A should not be taken seriously in practical reasoning, and so should be simply excluded from consideration altogether. Briggs (2010, p. 17) objects that it is ad hoc to exclude all dominated options in this way. After all, automatically excluding all dominated options would solve Newcomb's problem immediately, without any need to appeal to BT. But in fact, BT provides an explanation of why dominated options should be excluded in this way. Consider a pair-wise comparison between two options A and B with respect to the kind of evidentially expected comparative value that BT relies on. If A is dominated by B, A will lose this pair-wise comparison with B in a particularly decisive waysince A will lose this comparison with B, (i) irrespective of where the benchmarks lie, and (ii) irrespective of all the probabilities involved (at least so long as these probabilities are non-zero). In this way, there is nothing to be said in favour of A that cannot also be said in favour of B, while there is something to be said in favour of B that cannot be said in favour of A. So it does not seem ad hoc for a proponent of BT to insist that such dominated options should simply be excluded from consideration.
I suspect that ordinary agents often have an intuitive sense of the benchmark that they are using. This benchmark corresponds to the difference between (i) outcomes of a course of action that seem intuitively to be bad outcomes (that is, outcomes that count as reasons against the course of action) and (ii) outcomes that seem intuitively to be good outcomes (that is, outcomes that count as reasons in favour of that course of action). Ordinary agents have no difficulty deciding whether an outcome of a course of action counts as good or bad-that is, as a reason for or against the course of action in question-and it is clear that only some sort of "benchmark" can take us beyond judgments about which outcomes are better and which are worse, to judgments about which outcomes are good and which are bad. So it seems plausible that ordinary agents often have some intuitive idea of the benchmark that they are using.
I proposed above that the reasonable ways of setting the benchmarks would identify the benchmark for each state of nature with "some kind of weighted average of the degrees of goodness within that state of nature of all the options that deserve to be taken seriously." The intuitive idea is that this benchmark is, as Briggs (2010, p. 11) puts it, "the default level of value" that is available in this state of nature. So clearly this benchmark cannot be (i) higher than the highest or optimal value available in the state of nature, or (ii) lower than the lowest or pessimal value that can be achieved in the state of nature by any option that deserves to be taken seriously. But otherwise, there seems to be no principled reason for favouring one weighted average over any other. So I tentatively conclude that all the weighted averages that meet these conditions are equally reasonable. The only constraint is that every reasonable way of setting the benchmarks uses a single kind of weighted average, which fixes the benchmark for each state of nature in the same way.
Every measure of comparative value that results from using one of these kinds of weighted averages to set the relevant benchmarks is, in effect, a mixture of the two extreme measures that I mentioned earlier, "regret" and "relief" (so long as the definition of "relief" excludes the options that do not deserve to be taken seriously from consideration). My tentative conclusion, then, is that no particular mixture of "regret" and "relief" is uniquely reasonable: every possible mixture of "regret" and "relief" is an equally reasonable way of setting these benchmarks.
One way of using this idea of a plurality of equally reasonable ways of setting the benchmarks would be to suggest that in every choice situation, the agent must arbitrarily select a single definite mixture of "regret" and "relief" as her measure of comparative value, and that for every state of nature, the agent must assess the value of the options within that state of nature by means of this measure. The options that it is rational for the agent to choose are those that maximize evidentially expected comparative value according the agent's selected measure.
Alternatively, we could distinguish between preferences that are "absolutely" rationally required and preferences that are "absolutely" rationally permissible. Let us say that to "prefer" A over B is to be such that one chooses A and not B if one chooses either. Then we can say that one is "absolutely" rationally required to prefer A over B if and only if A's evidentially expected comparative value is at least as high as B's relative to all reasonable ways of setting the benchmarks, and higher than B's relative to some reasonable ways of setting the benchmarks. It is "absolutely" rationally permissible for one to prefer A over B if and only if one is not absolutely required not to prefer A over B. So, for example, if A's evidentially expected comparative value is higher than B's relative to some reasonable ways of setting the benchmarks, but lower than B's relative to some other reasonable ways of setting the benchmarks, then both A and B will be absolutely rationally permissible. Since these are intrinsically puzzling choice situations to be in, it may be plausible to say that both options are rationally permissible in these cases.
The "independence of irrelevant alternatives"
In the last two sections, I shall consider two objections that might be raised against this theory BT. The first of these objections is that BT conflicts with the principle that is sometimes known as the "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives" (IIA). 22 I shall first explain why it is inevitable that BT will collide with the IIA. Then I shall argue that there is no reason at all for a proponent of BT to accept the IIA. At most, there is a reason to accept a superficially similar though in fact quite different principle. Fortunately, as we shall see, BT is quite consistent with this second principle. Finally, I shall argue that there are also reasons that are quite independent of BT to be sceptical about the IIA.
As it is usually understood, the IIA rules out the following possibility. Suppose that there are two choice situations C S 1 and C S 2 such that in C S 1 there are three available options A, B, and C, while C S 2 is simply a "contracted" version of C S 1 -that is, in C S 2 there are only two available options, A and B, but otherwise C S 1 and C S 2 are as similar to each other in every respect as it is possible for them to be. Then according to the IIA, it is impossible for it to be simultaneously the case that the rational choice in C S 1 is A and the rational choice in C S 2 is B. The ranking of A and B relative to each other must be the same in both C S 1 and C S 2 because it is "independent" of the third "irrelevant" alternative C.
It is easy to show that BT is bound to conflict with this principle. We can easily find a choice situation involving three options, A, B, and C, that has the following feature: in the most similar "contracted" choice situation involving just A and B, BT requires choosing A; in the most similar "contracted" situation involving just B and C, BT requires will require choosing B; and in the most similar "contracted" situation involving just A and C, BT requires choosing C. So, wherever we put the benchmark in the three-option choice situation that involves all three options A, B, and C, one of the rankings of these options in the "contracted" choice situations ( A over B, B over C, and C over A) will be "overturned" in the three-option situation-producing a violation of the IIA.
Let me give an example. Suppose that there are three Boxes-Box A, Box B, and Box C. There are two possible states of nature: in the first state of nature S 1 , there is nothing in Boxes A and C, and $2,000 in Box B; in the second state of nature S 2 , there is $900 in Box A, nothing in Box B, and $1,800 in Box C. Your choosing either Box A or Box B is strong (but not overwhelming) evidence that you are in state of nature S 2 , while your choosing Box C is strong (but not overwhelming) evidence that you are in S 1 . The following tables show what BT implies about this case if the benchmark in these two-option choice situations is simply the average value of the two options in each state of nature. (In fact, it does not matter where the benchmark is set in this case: shifting the benchmark around in this case makes no difference to the way in which BT ranks the two available options in any of these three two-option choice situations.) As these tables show, in the "contracted" choice situation involving just A and B, BT requires choosing A, while in the "contracted" situation involving just B and C, it requires choosing B, and in the "contracted" situation involving just A and C, it requires choosing C. So whatever BT says about the "expanded" choice situation involving A, B, and C, it will end up violating the IIA. (In fact, wherever exactly the benchmark is set, in the expanded choice situation BT will require choosing A.)
Evidential probabilities
Is this an objection to BT? I do not believe that it is. The "contracted" choice situation is simply a different situation from the "expanded" choice situation. It is logically impossible for any agent to be in both situations at the same time. It cannot be the case both that the only options available to you are A and B, and also that your available options include a third option C as well. The central idea of my approach is precisely that the crucial factor in rational decision making is the way in which all the available options compare with each other within each state of nature, and so my approach will obviously accept that two choice situations in which different options are available will be crucially different from each other-at least so long as all of those options are ones that deserve to be taken seriously by a rational deliberator. 23 For this reason, the ranking of the options in terms of their evidentially expected comparative value was always meant to be situation-relative-that is, relative to the choice situation of the relevant agent at the relevant time. For the purposes of a theory of rational choice, all that we need is a ranking of options that is situation-relative in this way. In every choice situation that one might be in, one can be guided by a ranking of options that is relative to that choice situation. Rankings of options that are not relative to particular choice situations in this way are not necessary for guiding the rational choices of deliberating agents.
There is a second principle that may sound somewhat similar to the IIA, although it is in fact a fundamentally different principle. This second principle does not try to link different choice situations with each other: it links pieces of "partial" practical reasoning that focus on different subsets of the available options within the same choice situation. According to this second principle, a rational piece of "partial" reasoning that focuses on a proper subset of the available options should rank these options in the same way as a rational piece of "total" reasoning that considers all of the available options.
However, it is clear that my approach is consistent with this second principle. The only reason why my approach collided with the IIA was because the benchmark for each state of nature can shift between one choice situation and another. But according to my approach, the benchmarks for the relevant states of nature must be selected in view of all the options that deserve to be taken seriously. Once they are selected for that choice situation, it is these benchmarks that are used for evaluating all of these options, whether one considers all of the options or only a proper subset of them. If the benchmarks are fixed, then the comparative values of each option within each state of nature are also fixed; and so long as the conditional probabilities also do not shift, my approach will generate the same ranking of a set of options-regardless of whether or not they are all of the available options or only a proper subset of them. So my approach is quite compatible with this second principle.
When it comes to the version of the IIA that I am committed to rejecting, decision theorists are sharply divided. Some decision theorists-most notably, Amartya Sen (1993)-regard it as unmotivated and implausible, while other decision theoristssuch as Ken Binmore (2009, pp. 156-157 )-regard it as compelling. It is not possible for me to survey the whole debate here; but I shall try to give some reasons for thinking that we should side with Sen and against Binmore here.
First, there are other counterexamples to the principle. Some of the most striking of these counterexamples involve incommensurability. Suppose that the two options A and B are very different from each other. For example, following John Broome (1997), we might imagine that A is a career in the army, while B is a career in the church. In some cases, it seems that it is not true-or at least not determinately true-either that A is better than B or that B is better than A. In this case, it might also seem true that A and B are not equally good either, since if a third option A+ were available, where A+ is just like A except that it is "sweetened" in some way (it involves a salary that is $1000 greater, say), it seems undeniable that A+ is better than A, but it does not seem to follow from this that A+ is better than B. Now, consider the choice situation in which the only available options are A and B. In this case, a rational agent would regard both A and B as options that it is rational to choose; in that sense, the agent does not prefer either A or B over the other. But now consider a second choice situation in which all three options, A+, A, and B, are available. In this second choice situation, a rational agent would regard A+ and B as options that it is rational to choose, but A would presumably be ruled out, as an option that it is irrational to choose; so in that sense, in this second choice situation, B is preferred over A. So, whether or not the rational agent will prefer A over B may depend on whether a third option A+ is available. In this way, our intuitive judgments on cases involving this sort of incommensurability conflict with the IIA. 24 24 Objection (suggested by an anonymous referee): "The IIA places a plausible constraint on preferences among options in cases where adding or removing an option does not change the options' utilities. In these cases, rational preferences among the options available do not change as the availability of options changes. However, the options' ranking according to BT changes as the availability of options changes. …Why should rational choice disregard preferences among options and follow BT's ranking of options?" Reply: As I explained above, I am not assuming here that the relevant notion of "goodness" or "value" must be a notion of "utility" (where "utility" is a measure of how strongly the relevant agent prefers the relevant prospects); as I have formulated it, BT makes no use of the notion of utility, but only of a much more generic Secondly, we can of course concede that there are many cases where the IIA does indeed hold. In particular, the IIA certainly seems to hold in cases that involve (i) no incommensurability, and (ii) no probabilistic dependence of the states of nature on the agent's choices. But of course my theory BT agrees that the IIA holds in these cases (since as we have seen, BT never diverges from CDT in these cases). This suggests that the widespread acceptance of the idea that the IIA holds universally in all cases may simply be the result of an overgeneralization. 25
"Nearly dominated" options
Finally, I shall consider an objection that is due to Briggs (2010, p. 17) . I have already responded to Briggs's objection that it is unacceptably ad hoc to stipulate that all dominated options should excluded from consideration, as options that "do not deserve to be taken seriously." But Briggs has another objection as well. Suppose that we start with a case in which there is an option that is weakly dominated, and then very slightly tweak the case-by adding some minor benefit to the weakly dominated option-so that in this tweaked version of the case, although no option is dominated by any other, there is an option that is "as close to weakly dominated as you like". Then-according to Briggs's objection-if we set up the conditional probabilities in the right way, BT will imply that it is the rational choice.
Footnote 24 continued notion of "value" or "goodness". So the part of this objection that matters for our purposes is just the claim that "Choice according to BT conflicts with choice according to preferences among options." But as the cases of incommensurability show, "preferences" of the sort that are essentially tied to rational choice do sometimes change as the availability of options changes (even in cases in which theorists who believe in "utility" would say that the utility of options does not change). So the proponent of BT should insist that the relevant sort of "preferences" among options (just like the choice of options) should also conform to the ranking of options that is given by BT. Thus, there is no conflict between choice according to BT and choice "according to preferences among options." 25 Objection (suggested by an anonymous referee): "If I prefer a bet at 1:3 on horse A winning next year's Cheltenham Gold Cup to a bet at 1:3 on A's not winning it when those are the only bets on offer, but my preference is reversed when some third bet is also offered (and declined), then why is it not possible to extract money from me by offering the first two bets every day and the third bet as an additional (but never exercised) option on alternate days?" Reply: This case cannot ground any objection to BT unless there is some probabilistic dependence of the outcome of the race on my choices. So (e.g.) suppose that I know that an oracle has predicted what choices I will make, and depending on what the oracle has predicted, has taken steps to fix the outcome of the race. Then my being offered a new bet that was not previously available should change the beliefs about my situation that guide me in making my decision: it obviously introduces a new set of conditional beliefs-the beliefs that are conditional on my taking this new bet (which according to BT are the relevant probabilities to be used in evaluating this option); but in addition, as we saw in Sect. 3, when we explored the theories of Joyce and Arntzenius, it will also change my unconditional beliefs as well. So this case involves the bookmaker's manipulating me by getting me to switch back and forth between two different sets of beliefs. (Indeed, I will switch from one of these belief-sets to the other, simply in response to being offered each choice in the sequence, even if both I and the bookmaker forget all about each bet after it has been made.) Clearly, one of these two belief-sets will be further from the truth than the other (in the sense that one of them will involve assigning a higher probability to a false proposition than the other). In that sense, the bookmaker is in effect deceiving me, at least part of the time, about the nature of my situation. It is surely not surprising that a bookmaker can pump me for money by deceiving me in this way. No decision theory can render us immune to such manipulation.
Here is a case that has the relevant structure. A village of 10,000 people is threatened by a cataclysm-say, by a tsunami or an earthquake or the like. There are three possible states of nature that you could be in:
1. S 1 , in which your pushing Button A will save just one person, and your pushing Button B or Button C will save no one; 2. S 2 , in which pushing Button A will save no one, pushing Button B will save 3,000 people, and pushing Button C will save 9,000; 3. S 3 , in which pushing Button A will save no one, pushing Button B will save 9,000 people, and pushing Button C will save 3,000.
You do not know which state of nature you are in. But you do know that an extraordinarily reliable predictor of your choices has made a prediction about which button you will push. If the predictor predicted that you would push Button A, she ensured that you have a 90% chance of being in S 1 , and 5% chances of being in both S 2 and S 3 ; if she predicted that you would push Button B, she ensured that you have a 90% chance of being in S 2 , and 5% chances of being in both S 1 and S 3 ; if she predicted that you would push Button C, she ensured that you have a 90% chance of being in S 3 , and 5% chances of being in both S 1 and S 2 . You know all this about the predictor's actions, and this is the only information that you have about which state of nature you are in. Let us assume that the degree of goodness of each option in each state of nature is exactly proportional of the number of lives that you save. Then this choice situation is represented by the following tables: What it is rational for you to choose in this case will depend on the "benchmarks" that you should use to judge the comparative values of these options in each state of nature. As I suggested above, each of the reasonable ways of setting these benchmarks is effectively equivalent to a certain mixture of "regret" and "relief". However, I have allowed that so long as you use the same mixture of regret and relief to set the benchmark for each state of nature in this choice situation, all such mixtures are equally reasonable.
Outcomes
So, let us suppose first that in this case, you approach the choice situation with a mixture that gives some significant weight to regret. For simplicity, let us just suppose that in each state of nature, the benchmark is simply the average of the values of the three outcomes in each state of nature. Then the case can be represented by the following tables. According to this way of setting the benchmark, the choice that looks most rational is to press button A. Briggs (2010, p. 17) seems to believe that this verdict on the case is unacceptable. I shall argue shortly that this verdict on the case is not in fact unacceptable. Before arguing for that point, however, we need to remember that according to my theory, the benchmark for each state of nature does not have to be set at the average value of the outcomes in that state of nature. As it turns out, on other ways of setting the benchmarks, my theory implies that the rational choices to make in this case is to push button B or button C (and not button A).
The simplest way to see this point is to suppose that the relevant benchmark for each state of nature is set at the extreme lowest level-that is, at the level of the worst or pessimal outcomes in that state of nature. When the benchmarks are set in this extreme way, comparative value is effectively equivalent to what I called "relief". In this case, the worst outcome in each state of nature is your saving no lives at all: in each state of nature, the comparative value of this outcome is 0 (that is, no relief at all), while the degree to which the other outcomes are better than this outcome depends purely on the number of lives saved. So, in effect, in this case, the "relief" that you get from each outcome is measured simply by the number of lives saved. Thus, when the benchmarks are set in this way, my theory implies that the rational options to choose are those that maximize evidentially expected relief-that is, that maximize the evidentially expected number of lives saved.
When the benchmarks are set in this way, my theory implies that pushing button B and pushing button C are the rational options to choose.
Evidentially expected "relief" So my theory does not say that pushing button A is the only rational option to choose. If you set the benchmarks sufficiently low, it will be rational to choose to push button B or button C. So, as I put it at the end of Sect. 7, this is a situation in which all three options are "absolutely" rationally permissible. Briggs's example will only refute my theory if pushing button A is completely irrational, so that my theory is wrong to allow that there is any rationally permissible way in which the agent can choose button A.
Why should it be totally irrational to push button A? CDT would certainly agree that there are versions of this case in which it is rational for you to push button A. In particular, if you assign a sufficiently high probability to your being in state of nature S 1 -the state of nature in which you are no power to save more than just one life, and can save this one life by pushing button A-then CDT would certainly agree that it is rational for you to push button A. So an objection to pushing button A must come from some perspective other than that of CDT. In effect, the objection must come from some perspective closer to that of EDT.
For example, it might be thought that pressing button A is irrational because button A at best saves only one life, while buttons B and C might save thousands-and saving thousands is surely better than saving just one! But as I argued in Sect. 4 above, this thought is not the conception of the choice situation that should be guiding your decision. This comparison between saving one life and saving thousands of lives is not a comparison of two outcomes that are both available in any single state of nature. It is a comparison between the absolute payoff of one option in one state of nature with the absolute payoff of another option in another state of nature-precisely the kind of comparisons of absolute payoffs across states of nature that my Gandalf-inspired approach rules out as irrelevant.
In this case, the true state of nature that you are in is either S 1 , a state in which the only available options are (i) saving one life and (ii) saving no one, or else a state like S 2 or S 3 , in which the only available options are (i) saving no one, (ii) saving 3000, and (iii) saving 9000. There is nothing that you can do to determine whether you are in S 1 , in which you have relatively little power to save people, or S 2 or S 3 , in which you have much more power to save people. So you are not really choosing between saving one life and saving thousands-no more than you are choosing between being powerless and being powerful. You are simply choosing which of these three buttons to press; and you do not know whether this is a choice between saving one life and saving no one, or between saving 9000, saving 3000, and saving no one.
Since you do not know for certain whether you are choosing between saving one life and saving none, or choosing between saving no one, saving 3000, and saving 9000, you will have to assign probabilities to the different hypotheses about which state of nature you are in. In this case, these probabilities will differ depending on which choice you are considering. On the assumption that you choose to push button A, it is probable that you are relatively powerless, but you will use your power correctly, to save the one person whom you are able to save. On the assumption that you choose to push button B or button C, it looks as though you are relatively powerful, but you will use your power badly, failing to save 6000 people whom you could easily have saved. This seems to me to be the right way for you to conceive of this choice situation-the way that should guide your decision making. But when the choice situation is understood in this way, it does not seem intuitively obvious that it cannot possibly be rational to choose to push button A. Indeed, my intuition about this case is that every one of the three possible choices in this case could be defensible-which is precisely what my theory BT implies about this case; and as we have seen, BT and CDT both agree on this point. Briggs may still have the intuition that pushing button A is a totally irrational option to choose. But since she offers little in the way of argument in support of this intuition, it is not clear that her contested intuition is a powerful weapon to wield against my theory. 26 In conclusion: It is clear that much more investigation will be required to determine whether or not the approach sketched here is really correct. Above all, we should find out whether we can develop anything that plays the role in BT that the "representation theorems" play in the traditional theories of rational choice such as CDT and EDT. 27 All that I have aimed to do here is to articulate a new conception of rational choice, and to try to make it plausible that this conception also deserves to be "on the market" as a possible solution to these difficult problems. As I have argued, my conception seems to have the advantage that while it is relatively conservative, and agrees with CDT both about all cases where the states of nature are probabilistically independent of one's choice, and about all cases in which there is a dominant option, it can also accommodate the intuitively compelling counterexamples to CDT that have recently been articulated by Egan (2007) . 28 
